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STATE OF UTAH 
FRED H. BUHLER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
VERL STONE, Utah County Commis-
sioner, MACK HOLLEY, Utah County 





STATEMENT OF NATURE OR THE CASE 
This is an action to determine the constitutionality 
of Utah County Ordinance 1970-1, relating to the inspec-
tion and cleaning of real property, and also, seeking a 
preliminary injunction enjoining Utah County from en-
forcing said ordinance. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court held that the ordinance is an 
exercise of the police power, that due process does not 
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require judicial process, the ordinance is not vague or 
uncertain, and dissolved the preliminary injunction and 
dismissed the complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek the affirmance of the District Court 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Fred L. Buhler, resides in Highland, 
Utah. Mr. Buhler has accumulated in excess of 261 ve-
hicles on his property and in close proximity to his home. 
These vehicles consist mostly of automobiles with several 
trucks, and one or two snowmobiles. There was some 
question raised at the trial as to whether or not the plain-
tiff, Mr. Buhler, knew how many of the vehicles were in 
ninning condition, however, Mr. Buhler agreed that it 
would be a fair statement to say ninety per cent of the 
vehicles are not running at the present time. Of the total 
number of vehicles, five of them are currently registered 
and inspected. Titles to many of the vehicles are either 
lost or otherwise unavailable and many of the titles that 
the plaintiff has are not in his name but still in the name 
of the person from whom he received the vehicle. 
These vehicles stored in open view on the plaintiff's 
property is a violation of Utah County Ordinance 1970-1. 
Therefore, a letter was sent from the Commission on 
March 6, 1973, informing Mr. Buhler the problem had 
to be corrected within 30 days. As a result of that letter, 
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a meeting was scheduled with the plaintiff, Mr. Buhler, 
and members of the County Commission and members 
of the County Attorney's Office on April 26, 1973. Then, 
under the date of May 8, 1973, a letter was sent to the 
plaintiff from the Commission confirming that the plain-
tiff had until June 25, 1973. This extension in time for 
plaintiff to comply was given to him so as not to interefere 
in any way with his fanning operation and spring plant-
ing. On July 6, 1973, a letter was sent to the plaintiff 
stating that he must remove his personal items from the 
cars so that the County would be able to come in and 
clean up the property. 
The plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order 
on July 13, 1973, and the County was prevented from 
any clean-up operation of the plaintiff's vehicles. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS 
PURPOSES COUNTY ORDINANCE 1970-1 
PROVIDES AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY 
FOR A HEARING BY GIVING THE PROP-
ERTY OWNER NOTICE AND TIME IN 
WHICH TO CHALLENGE COUNTY AC-
TION. 
Basic to the due process requirements of the consti-
tution is the idea that the state should not be allowed 
to arbitrarily deny a citizen of his rights, property, or 
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possessions. It has been presumed by the courts that 
providing the property owner notice of pending action 
against his property and allowing him an opportunity to 
protest that action under the supervision of the courts 
assures the property owner of a fair chance to assert his 
position and insures against arbitrary action by the state. 
The ordinance in question provides these necessary safe-
guards, and therefore should be upheld. 
The first requirement of due process is met by section 
3-13-11 which in part reads: 
Duty of the County Board of Health, Notice. 
Upon a determination that a violation of the 
provisions of Sections 2, 3, 6 and 9 of this 
chapter exists, the County Board of Health 
or the employee designated by the Board of 
County Commissioners shall ascertain the 
name of the owner and description of the 
premises where the violation exists, and shall 
serve notice in writing upon the owner or 
occupant of such property, either personally 
or by mailing notice, postage prepaid, ad-
dressed to the owner or occupant at the last 
known post office address as disclosed by the 
records of the County Assessor.. . . 
The notice required by Section 3-13-11 amply satisfied 
due process requirements and is not challenged by the 
appellant. 
The Supreme Court in Springer v. United States, 
102 U. S. 586, (1880), enunciated the second requirement 
of due process: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I t is sufficient, where only property rights are 
concerned, that there is at some stage an oppor-
tunity for a hearing and a judicial determina-
tion, (emphasis added) 
The Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 
U. S. 306 (1950), further declared: 
The words of the due process clause . . . re- ^ 
quire that deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty by adjudication be preceded by notice 
and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate 
to the nature of the case. Id. at 313. (emphasis 
added) 
In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), the Court 
indicated that the opposing factors which need to be 
balanced in determining the appropriateness of a hearing 
opportunity are (1) the value placed by society on the 
interest involved and (2) the state's interest in judicial 
economy. Id., at 374, 378. The Court held in the Boddie 
case that an individual's right to a divorce proceeding 
could not be denied, but stated: 
Due process does not of course require that 
the defendant in every civil case actually have 
a hearing on the merits. Id. at 378. (emphasis 
added) 
In striking a balance where certain police powers are con-
cerned, the property owner's need for a mandatory and 
automatic hearing is outweighed by the state's interest 
in avoiding meaningless and wasteful use of the courts 
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and the state's need for an efficient and unburdened 
method of dealing with nuisances, health hazards, and 
other matters of community welfare. To use up valuable 
court time to review each and every county ordinance 
violation without regard to the existence or sincerity of 
an objection by the property owner is not the intent or 
requirement of due process. McQuillin on Municipal Cor-
porations, vol. 7 revised (1968), discusses this matter in 
the context of summary abatement action: 
The power of municipalities to declare and 
abate public nuisances and the right of sum-
mary action in the abatement exist at common 
law under the police power. This remedy has 
not been impaired by constitution, statute or 
decision. On the contrary, statutes providing 
for abatement of nuisances usually provide for 
their summary abatement by public authorities 
including municipal officials, in proper cases 
and by proper proceedings. The theory of the 
rule is that the requirement of preliminary for-
mal legal proceedings in a judicial trial would 
result in defeating the beneficial abjects sought 
to be obtained. Such municipal power has not 
been impaired by the constitution, for if the 
property has in fact been used in violation of 
the law, and is a public nuisance, the owner 
has no cause of complaint. If not, the owner 
has recourse to the courts. A municipality has 
authority to summarily abate that which it has 
declared to be public nuisance. Where the nuis-
ance is physical and tangible, a statute may 
direct its summary abatement by executive 
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officials without intervention of judicial pro- ;^  
ceedings, in cases analogous to those where the 
remedy by summary abatement existed at com-
mon law . . . therefore, it may well be said that 
laws authorizing summary abatement of pub- . 
lie nuisances do not deprive one of liberty or 
property without due process of law or a trial 
by jury. In truth, formal legal proceedings and 
trial by jury are neither necessary or appropri-
ate in cases of this character . . . Id., Section 
24.71 
It is not fatal to ordinance 1970-1 that no hearing is ex-
plicity required. That the property owner has access to 
adjudication in the event that he wishes to challenge the 
applicability or validity of the ordinance is sufficient 
opportunity to satisfy due process requirements. 
In Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 99 N. W. 2d 156, the 
Wisconsin Court stated: 
The plaintiffs do not complain of any pro-
cedural lack of due process in the application 
of the ordinance to their property I t would be 
most difficult to substantiate such a contention 
in view of the adequate time extended to the 
plaintiffs to remedy their violations, and the 
opportunity to have had a hearing before the 
commissioner on the merits if they had elected 
to do so. 
We find no denial of due process in the threat-
ened application of the enforcement procedures 
of the ordinance to the plaintiffs or their prop-
erty. Id. at 163. 
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Where certain state police powers are concerned, it is not 
an actual hearing but rather the opportunity for a hear-
ing which is required. A property owner is not denied 
due process if he fails to take advantage of such an oppor-
tunity. 
The appellants cite Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67 
(1972), for the proposition that a statute ordinance must 
provide for a hearing before the state may take private 
property. Although the Fuentes doctrine has been sub-
stantially narrowed in Mitchel v. W. T. Grant Co., 94 
S. Ct. 40, L. Ed. 2d 406 (1974), it is instructive to ex-
amine Fuentes to determine whether or not ordinance 
1970-1 is inconsistent with the Court's holding in that 
case. The Supreme Court struck down Florida and Penn-
sylvania Replevin Statutes for not providing an opportun-
ity for the property owner (debtor) to challenge a writ 
of replevin before deprivation of the property occurred. 
These statutes permitted a private party (the creditor) 
to obtain a prejudgment writ of replevin by mere ex parte 
application to a court clerk coupled with the posting of 
a bond for doable the value of the item to be seized. No 
notice to the debtor or proof of right of possession was 
required. The Court characterized the problem as fol-
lows: 
Thus at the same moment that the defendant 
receives the complaint seeking repossession of 
property through court action, the property is 
seized from him. H e is provided no prior notice 
and allowed no opportunity whatever to chal-
lenge the issuance of the writ. Id. at 75. 
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Because there was no time between notification of the 
action and actual execution thereof, the debtor had no 
opportunity to challenge the action before the property 
was taken: 
The court has traditionally insisted that what-
ever its form, opportunity for that hearing ,. 
must be provided before the deprivation at 
issue takes effect.1 Id. at 82. 
Ordinance 1970-1 provides for the notice required by 
Fuentes (as previously discussed) and forbids any ac-
tion by the state within a flexible amount of time after 
notice is served. Section 3-13-11 provides the opportunity 
to remedy the violation: 
Within such time as the County Board of 
Health . . . may designate which shall be no 
less than ten (10) days after the date of ser-
vice of such notice. 
Only after such time may the county (in accordance with 
county ordinance Section 3-13-12) act to remove the 
offensive property. Within such time the offending prop-
erty owner has, as McQuillin puts it) recourse to the 
courts. Specifically, Utah Code Annotated 3-46-9 allows 
the property owner a judicial hearing in district court if 
if he wishes to challenge the ordinance's "validity" or 
"applicability" provided "it is alleged that the ordinance 
1(W. T. Grant Co., supra, does not require that the opportunity for 
a hearing come before deprivation provided that the initial writ of 
replevin is issued by a judge rather than a clerk.) 
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or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs 
or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights 
ar privileges of the plaintiff". See U. C. A. 63-46-3, (1) 
and (4), Available also to the plaintiff are the tradi-
tional remedies of extraordinary writ under Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 65B and the forms of injunctive relief 
provided by rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(1972). 
The respondent argues that the notice and time pro-
vided by Ordinance 1970-1 coupled with the remedies 
provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and State 
statute give sufficient opportunity to challenge county 
action so as to prevent arbitrary county action and satisfy 
the demands of due process where the exercise of police 
powers are involved. 
POINT II. 
BECAUSE ORDINANCE 1970-1 DOES NOT 
INTERFERE WITH FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS, AND BECAUSE THE CONCEPTS 
EXPRESSED ARE DIFFICULT TO EX-
PRESS MORE CLEARLY, THE CERTAIN-
TY OF THE ORDINANCE SHOULD BE UP-
HELD. 
The use of language inevitably produces uncertainty 
to some degree. "Condemned to the use of words; we can 
never expect mathematical certainty from our language." 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 92 S. Ct. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I I 
2294. For the purposes of due process a general standard 
of specificity has been proposed by the Supreme Court: 
. . . a statute which either forbids or requires 
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess 
at its meaning and differ as to its application 
violates the first essential of due process of 
law. Connally v. General Construction Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126. 
Ironically, this test itself is less than crystal clear and, 
as with any simplistic test, is not without qualification 
in its applications. The respondent wishes to emphasize 
two qualifications to the court. 
FIRST. The court must take into consideration 
the degree of specificity with which the concept in ques-
tion can be expressed: 
As indicated the test to be applied in determin-
ing whether the statute or ordinance is consti-
tutionally vague is whether "men of common 
intelligence" can readily understand its terms. 
Superimposed upon this test, however, is the 
admonitiation that courts, in determining the 
degree of certainty required by due process 
should take into consideration the legislative 
body's difficulty in expressing particular con-
cepts. State v. Cole, 18 Ariz. app. 237, 501 
P.2d413 (1972). (emphasis added) 
A state or county should not be prevented from discharg-
ing its responsibility to protect the health and general 
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welfare of the community solely because the nature of the 
offensive activity is difficult to define or too varied to 
allow specification. 
SECOND. The court should determine whether the 
"ordinance impinges upon the exercise of First Amend-
ment activities." Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of 
Police Com're of L. A., vOl Cal. Rptr. 798, 496 P. 2d 840 
(1972). The California court in Burton v. Municipal 
Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 441 P. 2d 281 (1968), struck 
down as vague and over broad a motion picture licensing 
statute which allowed the denial of a license to a theater 
operator if "the operation would not comport with the 
peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals and gen-
eral welfare of the public". Four years later, the same 
court upheld a licensing statute couched in identical terms 
as sufficiently specific for matters not involving First 
Amendment activities, Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board 
of Police Com'rs, (supra). The court stated: 
I t is apparent that the rule announced in Bur-
ton applies only to those situations in which 
the operation of a licensing ordinance impinges 
upon the exercise of First Amendment activi-
ties, rather than ordinary commercial enter-
prises. Id. at 844. 
The court then noted: 
I t must be kept in mind that there are an in-
finite variety of activities or conduct which 
could result in potential or actual danger to 
the "peace, health, safety, convenience, good 
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morals, and general welfare" of the public. A 
municipality cannot resasonably be expected to 
isolte and specify those precise activities or 
conduct which are intended to be prescribed. 
Id. at 845. 
An examination of the two sections in question will reveal 
the First Amendment activities are not impinged upon 
or related to the offenses prohibited: 
Section 3-13-2. Real property to be kept clean. 
I t shall be unlawful for any person, corpora-
tion, partnership, or legal entity owing or oc-
cupying any real property in the unincorpor-
ated area of Utah County to fail to control 
the growth of injurious and noxious weeds on 
such property or to fail to remove from such 
property any such weeds or any refuse and any 
unsightly or deleterious objects or structures 
upon notice from Utah County as provided 
in this chapter, (emphasis added) 
Section 3-13-3. Control of unsightly wastes. 
I t shall be unlawful for any person to cause 
or permit junk, scrap metal, waste paper pro-
ducts, discarded building materials, or any un-
used, abandoned vehicle, vehicles, or abandoned 
parts, machinery, or machinery parts, or other 
waste materials to be in or upon any yard, lot, 
or piece of property within unincorporated 
area of this County or in or upon the parking 
space, or sidewalk adjoining such yard, lot, or 
piece of property within the unincorporated 
area of this County, whenever said items shall 
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be unsightly and in public view, (emphasis 
added) 
The county in trying to prevent the accumulation of 
harmful and obnoxious refuse has used the terms "un-
sightly" and "deleterious" to describe the conditions which 
it seeks to control. It is apparent that the nature of po-
tential health hazards from accumulated debris can vary 
greatly. To require specific descriptions for each possible 
offensive condition would place an "unreasonable" burden 
on the county and unnecessarily limit its capacity to pro-
mote the general welfare of the community. Thus because 
Ordinance 1970-1 does not involve First Amendment rights 
and because the county cannot practically phrase the 
ordinance in more specific terms, the ordinance should 
be upheld. 
POINT III. 
THE TERM "UNSIGHTLY" AS USED IN 
ORDINANCE 1970-1 IS NOT AN UNCONSTI-
TUTIONAL AESTHETIC STANDARD — 
NOR IS ENFORCEMENT OF THE ORDI-
NANCE BASED SOLELY ON AESTHETIC 
CONSIDERATIONS. 
The police powers given states, counties, and munici-
pal corporations do not include the right to regulate mat-
ter of pure aesthetic such as sihape, size, and architecture 
of a house; color, size, and variety of trees and shrubs, 
etc., except as the health, safety, or general welfare of 
the public may be affected. Appellant cites an early 
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formulation of this principle in Youngstown v. KahnBros. 
Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio 654, 148 N. E. 842 (1925): 
We are therefore remitted to the proposition 
that the police power is based upon public 
necessity, and that public health, morals, or 
safety, and not merely aesthetic interest, must 
be in danger in order to justify its use. (em-
phasis added) 
Also cited by the appellant is 16 Am. Jur. 2d at 569, which 
in part reads: 
The state cannot limit or restrict the use which 
a person may make of his property under the 
guise of the police power, where the exercise 
of such power woudd be warranted solely on 
aesthetic considerations, (emphasis added) 
Neither of these authorities stand for the proposition that 
appearance cannot rationally or logically be related to 
health and safety considerations. The ordinance in ques 
tion is in fact a health measure. The introduction to this 
ordinance reads: 
An ordinance amending the three of the Re-
vised Ordinances of Utah County, Utah, 1956, 
relating to health and sanitation by adding 
thereto a new chapter to be known as chapter 
13 entitled "Inspection and Cleaning of Real 
Property". See appendix Ordinance 1970-1 
at 1. 
The county has the right under the police powers granted 
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it to require property owners to keep their property free 
of waste, debris, and junk which could pose a health 
or safety hazard to the public. Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. 
Bldg. Co., (supra). It is obvious that such is the purpose 
of the sections in question: 
Section 3-13-2. Real property to be kept clean. 
I t shall be unlawful for any person, corpora-
tion, partnership, or legal entity owning or 
occupying any real property in the unincor-
porated area of Utah County to fail to control 
the growth of injurious and noxious weeds on 
such property or to fail to remove from such 
property any such weeds or any refuse and any 
unsightly or deleterious objects or structures 
upon notice from Utah County as provided 
in this Chapter. 
Section 3-13-3. Control of unsightly wastes. 
I t shall be unlawful for any person to cause 
or permit junk, scrap metal, waste paper pro-
ducts, discarded building materials, or any 
unused, abandoned vehicle, vehicles, or aban-
doned parts, machinery, or machinery parts, or 
other waste materials to be in or upon any yard, 
lot or piece of property within the unincorpor-
ated area of this County or in or upon the 
parking spect, or sidewalk adjoining such yard, 
lot, or piece of property within the unincor-
porated area of this County, whenever said 
items shall be unsightly and in public view. 
In the above sections, the county has used "unsightly" 
as a threshold test. When junk, waste, scrap metal, etc. 
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accumulate to the point of being offensive to the eye, 
it becomes a concern to the county as a health and safety 
hazard. It cannot be said that the county is exercising 
its power to protect only an aesthetic interest when it 
used the point of "unsightliness"; a benchmark by which 
to evaluate the extent of an accumulation of refuse. 
In addition, the respondent takes issue with the idea 
that aesthetics alone cannot constitute a sufficient public 
interest to fall within the police powers of a state, county 
or city. Where unsightliness is aggravated enough to have 
a material effect on the community the county or city 
should be able to exercise its powers in the public interest. 
In Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N. Y. 2d 263, 225 N. E. 2d 749 
(1967), the New York court upheld the constitutionality 
of town zoning ordinance which regulated signs and blue-
boards. The court stated: 
. . . Advertising signs and billboards, if mis-
placed, often are egregious examples of ugli-
ness, distraction, and deterioration. They are 
just as much subject to reasonable controls, 
including prohibition, as enterprises which 
emit offensive noises, odors, or debris. The 
eye is entitled to as much recongnition as the 
other senses, but, of course, the offense to the 
eye must be substantial and be deemed to have 
material effect on the community or district 
pattern (p. 755.) 
The Oregon Court in Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 
400 P. 2d 255 (1965), stated: 
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We join in the view "that aesthetic considera-
tions alone may warrant an exercise of the 
police power." (p. 49, 400 P.2d p. 262.) 
The court in Oregon City v. Hartle, (supra), held that 
an ordinance prohibiting the establishment of auto wreck-
ing yards in Oregon City was a valid exercise of police 
power: 
. . . there is a growing judicial recognition of 
the power of city to impose zoning restriction 
which can be justified solely upon the ground 
that they will tend to prevent or minimize dis-
cordant and unsightly surroundings. This 
change in attitude is a reflection of the refine-
ment of our tastes and the growing apprecia-
tion of cultural values in a maturing society. 
The change may be ascribed more directly to 
the judicial expansion of the police power to 
include within the concept of "general welfare" 
the enhancement of the citizen's cultural life, 
(pp. 46-47, 400 P.2d p. 261.) 
In State v. Diamond, Inc., 429 P. 2d 825, the Hawaii 
Court upheld a billboard ordinance stating: 
We hold that the application of the ordinance 
to appellants constituted a regulation for the 
public welfore under the City's police power 
in a legitimate field for legitimate aesthetic 
reasons and that it does not constitute a taking 
of private property without the payment of 
compensation. Cromwell v. Ferrier, supra, 19 
N.Y. 2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749 (New York 
1967). 
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Auto graveyards, junkyards, and refuse ridden lots and 
the like are eyesores and visual nuisances at the most 
offensive kind. The proliferation of such should be pre-
vented. Whether for health and safety reasons or com-
pelling aesthetic reasons, it is in the interest and for the 
general welfare of the community to control "unsightly 
waste". Therefore the county's use of the term "unsight 
ly" is not unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah County government is charged with the respon-
sibility of protecting the interests of county residents and 
looking out for their general welfare. Health and safety 
concerns are a large portion of that responsibility. Be-
cause of the sometimes exigent nature of health and 
safety hazards, the county ordinance governing proced-
ures in these areas must allow for quick and efficient 
action over a broad spectrum of situations. At the same 
time the rights of individual property owners must be 
safeguarded by those same procedures. To accomplish 
both o fthese goals, the legal formality of such procedures 
must be kept at a minimum. County Ordinance 1970-1 
has effectively accomplished this by giving the property 
owner timely notice of pending county action while, by 
its wording, allowing the county a broad enough latitude 
to deal with any situation which the Board of Health or 
its agents may consider offensive. In thus providing, 
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ordinance 1970-1 comports with basic notions of justice 
and fair play and should be upheld as complying with due 
process requirements. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARNOLD C. ROYLANCE 
Utah County Attorney 
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